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Abstract 
Low-wage jobs in Denmark are characterized by short durations and a relatively high 
mobility to higher wage positions, but also to unemployment. This fact might to some 
extent be attributed to the generous Danish UI system. The theoretical prediction for this 
relation is twofold. First, a generous UI system will increase reservation wages and 
thereby increase the effective minimum wage. This will exclude the least productive 
individuals from employment and thereby increase the lowest skill level among 
employed individuals. Hence, the Danish low-wage earners will tend to be better 
qualified and their duration as low-wage earners will therefore tend to be shorter. Second, 
the generous benefit system will allow the unemployed person to wait for better jobs, and 
likewise, force the employing firms to provide jobs with better prospects. By exploiting 
several tightening of the Danish UI system during the late nineties, these hypotheses are 
tested by analysing low-wage durations following an unemployment-spell using hazard 
models allowing for correlation between low wage duration and previous unemployment 
spells. Results show that being eligible for UIB does indeed increase the transition out of 
low wage, both to higher wage jobs and returning to unemployment. At the same time 
approaching passive benefit exhaustion initially increases the likelihood of moving to 
low-wage employment and subsequently increases the likelihood of returning to 
unemployment after a spell of low wage. Moreover it decreases mobility to subsequent 
higher wage employment. Hence, decreasing the passive period seems to have a positive 
effect on the employment rate, but the jobs accepted seem to be of lower quality, i.e. with 
higher return rates and lower upward wage mobility. 
 
JEL codes: J31, J64, J65.   2
1. Introduction 
Compared to other countries, especially the US, the prevalence of dead-end low-wage 
jobs is very low in Denmark. In general, low-wage jobs in Denmark are characterized by 
short durations and a relatively high mobility to higher wage positions, but also the 
mobility out of employment is quit significant. Contrary to findings in the US (Andersson 
et al. (2005)), the escape from low-wage jobs in Danish firms is more prevalent within 
the firm, than between firms, although firm-specific differences exist (see Bolvig (2005)).  
The Danish low-wage jobs are to a large extent occupied by students or other transitory 
workers, for whom these jobs are never meant as permanent positions or even as a start of 
a career path. Moreover, some of the low-wage jobs often considered as dead-end jobs 
(shop assistants, call-centre employees, cleaning personnel etc.) are characterised by the 
availability of a visibly career paths and managers are often seeking to create variety in 
these kind of occupations (see Westergård-Nielsen (2008)). This is mainly done to attract 
better employees, and previous research show that different firms apply different 
strategies, either a constant low-wage - low ability strategy, or a career path – high ability 
strategy (see Sørensen (2008), or Bolvig (2006) for an empirical analysis of the entire 
economy).   
Now, one of the reasons for these important differences between the Danish and the US 
low-wage labour market might be attributed to the generous Danish UI system (see next 
section for detailed description). The fact that low-wage jobs in Denmark have to 
“compete” with a fairly high and rather long-lasting outside compensation, as the UI 
benefit, has at least two implications. First, the outside option of a high UI benefit (or a 
decent welfare benefit) is likely to prevent the least productive and least motivated 
individuals from getting or taking up any jobs, hence increasing the minimum 
productivity level among the pool of applicants. Then, in order to attract enough 
employees from this more able pool of applicants, firms are forced to (and able to) make 
these low-wage jobs more attractive by e.g. providing sensible career paths, attractive 
work schemes, more variation in work tasks and even formal training. 
Second, from the individual’s point of view, a generous benefit system will allow the 
unemployed person to spend more time searching for jobs, and hence increase the quality 
demanded of the jobs considered. The search theory predicts that the closer the   3
unemployed person is to benefit exhaustion the lower will his reservation wage be, and 
also the lower the demand for other non-wage compensations. 
 
Even though the Danish UI system still is rather generous, it has in fact gone through a 
series of tightening during the 1990ies. The purpose of this study is to analyse if and how 
these tightening have influenced the low-wage labour market. Referring to the above 
mentioned predictions of the Danish UI system, the tightening of the benefit system is 
expected to have a positive effect on the duration of low-wage; partly due to a decreased 
mobility to unemployment because the benefit system is less attractive, and partly due to 
less upward wage mobility, due to less pressure for career opportunities in low-wage 
jobs. 
 
The model applied is a refinement of a duration model presented in Belzil (2001). This 
model is particularly suitable for the purpose of this paper because it builds on the notion 
that UI benefit durations have an effect on the match quality of subsequent employment, 
after accounting for the adverse selection of the UI benefit system. Changes to the UI 
system will be exploited to identify effects of a variety of UI system measures. Whereas 
Belzil estimates the effect on the duration of subsequent employment, I focus on 
subsequent low wage duration and allow for competing exit destinations. Compared to 
previous analyses on year-to-year transitions between low wage and unemployment (see 
e.g. Steward (2005)), the duration model applied here is able to utilize the excellent 
longitudinal data available for the present paper. Besides a variety of variables covering 
individual, as well as firm-specific characteristics, this data consist of information on 
each individual’s weekly labour market state and it allows me to follow the same person 
in different labour market states over a period of considerable length. 
 
In the following section I describe the Danish UI benefit system and the main changes 
applied to it during the 1990ies. Then in section 3 the econometric model used to evaluate 
the hypothesis of the paper is presented. In section 4 I present the results and finally 
conclusion and summary is given in section 5.  
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2. The UI system in Denmark
1 
The Danish unemployment benefit system is organized in two parallel systems; one 
providing unemployment insurance benefit (UIB) for insured unemployed and the other 
providing social assistance (SA) for the non-insured unemployed. Social assistance is in 
principle available for everyone, but since it is a means tested benefit depending on 
household income and assets, only a minor part of the Danish labour force is eligible for 
it in case of unemployment. SA recipients are divided into two groups; those with 
unemployment as their only problem, and those who have social problems in addition to 
unemployment. Eligibility of UIB, on the other hand, relies on 1) membership of a UI 
fund, 2) employment requirements, and 3) maximum benefit duration. Moreover, 
members who become self-induced unemployed are exposed to a three-weeks quarantine. 
Until the late 1980s, the Danish unemployment benefit system could be described as a 
passive system with fairly easy access, high compensation and unemployment benefit 
eligibility for long periods. However, with the cyclical upturn in 1982-1986 and the 
following wage pressure dominating a number of sectors, major changes in the labour 
market policy was needed, see e.g. Jensen (1999). In 1994 the first reform directed 
toward the structural labour market problems was introduced and during the next years a 
number of reforms were put into force. In general, the reforms have been based on two 
strategies; shorter duration of the UIB-period (mainly the passive period) and more focus 
on activation and test of availability for the labour market; while the fairly high 
compensation rates for low skilled workers (up to 90%) has not been reformed. 
Before the labour market reform in 1994 an unemployed person was in reality able to 
receive UIB for 9 years without unsupported employment. This was possible because the 
right to UIB could be regained after half a year of subsidised activation. The eligibility to 
benefit required 12 months of membership as well as 26 weeks of employment during the 
last 3 years.  
 
                                                 
1 This section draws to a large extent on Bolvig et. al. (2007)   5
With the reform in 1994 the UIB period was divided into a passive (no ALMP) and an 
active (ALMP) period. Further, the possibility of re-earning eligibility to UIB through 
ALMP was now removed. In 1995 activation was made compulsory and used as a 
criterion for receiving UIB. During the late nineties the passive period of the UIB period 
was reduced from 48 months in 1994 to 24 months in July 1996 and finally to 12 months 
in 1999. However, transition rules implied that the real passive periods might have been 
longer for individuals with previous unemployment spells. In Table 1, below, the 
development since 1995 in the maximum passive duration is shown. It can be seen that 
for individuals with previous unemployment spells (old reference period) the passive 
duration is decreasing at a slower pace.  
Table 1 also presents the development in the employment requirement, which was 
increased in 1997 from 24 to 52 weeks within a reference period of 3 years. 
 
Table 1. 





















01.01.95 - 30.06.96  48 m / 60 m  26 w / 3 y  48 m / 60 m 26 w / 3 y 
01.07.96 - 31.12.96  24 m / 36 m  26 w / 3 y  36 m / 48 m
a  26 w / 3 y 
01.01.97 - 31.12.97  24 m / 36 m  52 w / 3 y  36 m / 48 m
a 52 w / 3 y 
01.01.98 - 31.12.98  24 m / 36 m  52 w / 3 y  24 m / 36 m
  52 w / 3 y 
01.01.99 - 31.12.99  12 m / 24 m  52 w / 3 y  21 m / 33 m 52 w / 3 y 
01.01.00 - 31.12.00  12 m / 24 m  52 w / 3 y  15 m / 27 m 52 w / 3 y 
Note: w=weeks, m=months, y=years. a) Reference periods started before July 1
st 1996. 
 
Throughout the entire period and still today the unemployment benefit amounts to 90 % 
of previous earnings until a maximum amount, which in 2006 is DKK 667 per day. 
Because of the relative low ceiling most UIB recipients, except low-skilled in the lower 
part of the wage distribution, have a real replacement rate well below 90 %. In 2006, the 
condition for receiving UI benefit requires membership of an unemployment insurance 
fund and 52 weeks of full employment during the last 3 years. The maximum duration of 
UIB is now 4 years; 1 year on passive UIB (no compulsory activation) and 3 years on 




The comprehensive Danish employer-employee linked data available for this study is 
extremely suitable for the purpose of this paper, since it allows me to follow the same 
person in different labour market states over a period of considerable length. 
The main sources are the Integrated Database for Labour Market Research (IDA), which 
contains employer and employee information on a yearly basis together with a spell 
database containing information on each person’s labour market state on a weekly basis. 
The spell database includes the period 1986-2002, but this analysis is restricted to the 
period 1995-2002 in order to avoid the large reform of the UI system implemented in 
1994. 
3.1 IDA 
The Integrated Database for Labour Market Research (IDA) is the most used 
administrative database for labour market studies in Denmark. It is an employer-
employee linked database, and it covers the entire Danish population (about 5.3 million) 
as well as all firms with at least one employee (about 250,000). About 250 different 
variables are available from IDA. For each employment spell, information on the 
employer is available and it is linked to the employee via a unique employer id. Both 
individuals and firms can be followed over time.  
IDA also provides information on the annual amount of UI benefit paid to each person. 
Even though these data only are available on an annual basis, they can still be used to 
estimate the amount of UIB spent within the reference period, and thereby enable the 
calculation of time until benefit exhaustion (see below). 
Moreover, for the present study, I use IDA to collect information on individual 
characteristics such as age, gender, level of education and marital status, and on firm 
characteristics such as industry and firm size. 
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3.1 Spell  data 
The spell data come from a data set constructed from various administrative registers 
from Statistics Denmark. It defines each person’s labour market state on a weekly basis 
within the following states: employment, unemployment, temporary unemployment, 
active labour market program, in formal education and out of the labour force including 
different welfare programs such as rehabilitation and social assistance. In case a person is 
observed in more than one register at the same time, the following order of preference 
between the different labour market states has been made: 1) unemployment, 2) 
education, 3) welfare programs and pension schemes, 4) employment and 5) otherwise 
out of the labour force. Hence, registration in the unemployment register (CRAM) 
dominates registration in any other register, whereas individuals not registered in any of 
the applied registers are defined as out of the labour force.
2  
The labour market states defined for this paper are low-wage employment, higher-wage 
employment
3, unemployment, ALMP and out of the labour force. Higher-wage 
employment spells and out of the labour force spells are merely used for identifying 
destination states from low-wage spells, whereas unemployment spells are used to 
identify individual-specific adverse selection effects (see the model description, below).  
A key variable calculated in the spell data is the firm-specific weekly wage rate. This 
wage rate, which is individual specific, is based on the individual’s annual wage within 
each employing firm and number of weeks worked within each firm within that year. The 
weekly wage can be used to calculate the hourly wage. For this purpose, the number of 
hours worked per week is estimated using the annual additional employment pension 
contribution (ATP) paid for each employee based on the number of hours worked per 
week. Since this ATP-payment is stepwise increasing, the number of hours worked per 
week can only be estimated within certain intervals. The quality of the hourly wage is 
hence related to the number of working hours, and the fewer weekly working hours, the 
less reliable is the measure. Consequently, I only include full-time workers, but since 
                                                 
2 See Larsen (2002) for further description of the spell data. 
3 I.e. non-low-wage employment.   8
part-time jobs only play a minor role in the Danish labour market
4 the exclusion of these 
workers is not expected to alter the result considerably.  
Low-wage workers are defined as those employees who have an hourly wage below 60% 
of the median annual hourly wage rate for the entire economy. 
3.1  Sampling frame  
I concentrate the analysis to the period 1995-2000. This gives us two changes to the 
benefit duration, specifically to the passive period, in 1996 and 1999, and one change to 
the employment requirement in 1997. Moreover various transition rules imply that 
unemployed individuals will face different rules throughout the period as illustrated in 
Table 1. To simplify, we concentrate the analysis to individuals aged 25-49 since special 
rules apply to those below 25 and those 50 years or older. 
From a 10 per cent sample of the above mentioned data set, I create a flow sample 
consisting of all individuals who have been employed in a low-wage job during the 
period 1996-2000. This enables me to gather information on previous unemployment 
spells going up to six years back (considering both pre and post 1994-reform 
unemployment spells). From these spells I collect all low-wage spells preceding an 
unemployment spell. To correct for adverse selection I also include all unemployment 
spell starting during the period 1995-1999. 
 
Next, I present the econometric model, which analyses the effects of the variables 
presented above.  
4. The Model 
As mentioned in the introduction, this paper aims to analyse whether the tightening of the 
UI system will affect the subsequent low-pay employments. Hence, are these low-wage 
jobs stepping stones to better paid jobs or do they merely serve as transitory states before 
returning to unemployment. The main question is if the mobility out of low wage has 
                                                 
4 Including all types of part-time jobs (student jobs included), the percentage of part-time jobs varies 
around 15 per cent during the period of interest, but when excluding all students the fraction decreases to 
less than 5 per cent.     9
changed for the group of previously unemployed individuals as a result of the changes in 
the UI benefit system.  
Similar for the labour market reforms implemented in Denmark during the 1990’ies is the 
variety of the incentive tools which have been implemented. I.e., for most reforms several 
components of the UI benefit systems have been changed. In addition, some of the 
reforms are implemented using transition rules, which might be dynamic or rely on 
individuals’ previous experiences. This means that rules and changes to rules differ 
between different individuals, and between different UI periods for the same individual. 
These discrepancies allow us to identify specific effects of incentives in the UI benefit 
system. I choose to focus on one comparable rule, the maximum benefit duration. I have 
chosen to neglect the compensation rate, which has otherwise often been used in 
analysing the incentives of the UI system, of two reasons. First, the compensation rate 
has been constant during the observation period. Second, this measure is less suitable for 
the objective to analyse the subsequent low-wage employment.   
Low-pay employment is defined as employment in jobs with hourly wages below the 
low-pay threshold (60 % of the median of the annual hourly wage distribution). 
Transition to higher pay will happen whenever we observe wages above the threshold for 
the low-wage worker. I.e. upward wage mobility might happen within the same firm, or 
by moving to another firm, and we do not distinguish between the two. Likewise, the 
duration of the low-pay spell might contain several low-pay jobs at different firms, since 
we do not account for mobility between firms, per se.  
4.1 UI  system  measures 
Before introducing the econometric model applied for the analysis, I shortly present the 
variables of interest.  
Clearly, the effect of a change in the system might go through both the previous 
unemployment spell as well as the current low-pay spell. Hence, the duration and 
destination state of a low-wage spell is not only depending on the rules of the UI benefit 
system during the current spell, but also during the previous unemployment spell. 
Imaging e.g. that a reform in the UI benefit system “forces” an unemployed person to 
enter a low-wage job, then it is likely that this motivation for entering the low wage job   10
will affect the duration of it, through the match quality (see Belzil (2001)). The notion is 
that the closer a person is to benefit termination the more likely he is to accept jobs of 
lower quality, and hence we will expect the hazard from low wage to unemployment to 
be negative affected by the remaining benefit duration, whereas the hazard to higher 
wage will be positive affected by the remaining benefit duration.  
First of all, a dummy variable indicating if a person is eligible for UI benefit, eligibleit, 
should be defined for each person at each point in time. This variable will vary between 
individuals who are exposed to different rules at the same time, and between times as the 
rules changes. For individuals who are not members of an insurance fond or for otherwise 
ineligible individuals, eligibleit will equal zero. eligibleit is a semi-macro level variables 
that describes the rules individual i is exposed to at time t, but it does not vary with the 
current maximum benefit duration of person i. Hence, for unemployed individuals who 
are eligible for UI benefit it is interesting to know when the benefit will expire. Therefore 
I introduce, bexit, which essentially is the maximum benefit duration minus the elapsed 
duration in unemployment, and it measures how close to benefit exhaustion the person is 
at time t. This variable will clearly be zero if the person is ineligible. Activation is an 
important factor in the Danish labour market policy and since 1994 the UI benefit period 
has been divided into a passive and an active period, but only the length of the passive 
period has been subject to changes during the late 1990’s. Therefore, I base time until 
benefit exhaustion merely on the passive period, i.e. pbexit measures the time until 
passive benefit exhaustion. The notion behind this variable is that unemployment with 
compulsory ALMP is less attractive and as such unemployed individuals will react by 
lowering their reservation wage when approaching the time where the passive period 
ends. Previous studies have identified a positive motivation/threat effect of compulsory 
ALMP on the hazard out of unemployment (see Geerdsen (2006) and Rosholm and 
Svarer (2004)). By including pbexit in the model we will be able to estimate if the threat 
effect will influence the duration of subsequent low wage. Pbex will be measured at the 
end of the previous unemployment spell, hence if individual i’s previous unemployment 
spell was ended at time τ, then pbexiτ  measures the length of the benefit period left when 
unemployment ended.    11
Finally, lagged duration of the previous unemployment spell, lagduriτ, is included in the 
model. This variable, which is also measured at the end of the previous unemployment 
spell, measures the degree by which the low-wage worker has been marginalised. 
 
4.1 Hazard  Model 
Now, let the duration of low-pay spell i be defined by the time at which the spell ends. 
Since I have weekly information on individual labour market states the continuous time 
specification of the duration model will be suitable for this application (see e.g. Lancaster 
(1990) for a comprehensive introduction to duration models). I apply a competing risk 
hazard specification, i.e. three different destination states are specified: hw: higher wage, 
u: unemployment, and out: other. Then the destination-specific hazard rate out of low pay 
for destinations to state l is defined as: 
()
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where m(t) = 1, 2,…, M denotes the steps in the stepwise constant baseline hazard, Xi is a 
vector of individual specific characteristics and U(τ) is a vector of variables concerning 
the previous passive unemployment period measured at timeτ  which is at the end of the 
period. 
The model is estimated using maximum likelihood, and the contribution to the likelihood 
function for each low-pay spell ending in destination state l is therefore given by: 
() ( )
0




ll l L h t eligible t h s eligible s ds ττ
⎡ ⎤
=⋅ − ⎢ ⎥
⎣ ⎦ ∫ XU XU  (0.2) 
where dl is an indicator for leaving a low pay to state l = hw, u, out. 
4.1  Unobserved heterogeneity and adverse selection 
As mentioned above UI benefit duration might affect subsequent employment duration 
through match quality. However, this correlation might also be explained by another 
hypothesis, i.e. adverse selection. Adverse selection arises from unobserved 
heterogeneity, and in this context it means that some individuals might possess   12
characteristics unobserved to the researchers that make them less attractive at the labour 
market. These individuals will both tend to have long unemployment spells, short 
employment spells, and if employed: a higher probability of low wage, hence we will 
observe a negative correlation between unemployment duration and subsequent 
employment, or a low pay-unemployment cycle. If we do not take this adverse selection 
into account, we might mistakenly interpreted a positive correlation between remaining 
benefit duration and the duration of the subsequent employment spell as solely due to 
match quality, even though unobserved heterogeneity might be the main reason.  
The right way to account for unobserved heterogeneity in a duration model is to allow for 
an individual specific error term. Since the unobserved heterogeneity will affect both the 
unemployment duration and the subsequent employment (low pay) duration, we need to 
estimate the hazard out of unemployment simultaneously with the hazard out of low pay, 
and allow the individual specific error terms to be correlated. This resembles the 
empirical model applied by Belzil (2001). Let’s define vi ={vi1, vi2, vi3} as the vector of 
individual specific factors affecting the hazard from low pay to destination 1: higher 
wage, 2: unemployment and 3: other, and υi as the individuals specific factor affecting 
the hazard out of unemployment. By allowing vi to be correlated with υi we are able to 
account for the adverse selection. Now, the hazard function out of subsequent low wage 
can be written in terms of the destination-specific hazard functions. 
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Likewise the unemployment hazard function can be defined as:   13
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Where Uu(t) is a vector of the two UI incentive variables pbex(t) and elig(t), which are 
time varying during the unemployment spell. pbex(t) is changing as the unemployment 
spell evolves and hence the benefit and passive period exhaustion approaches, whereas 
elig(t) only changes as the rules changes or as.  
The likelihood contribution of the unemployment spells is 
() ()
0
|, e x p |,
t
d
uu u u u L ht hs d s υυ
⎡ ⎤
=⋅ − ⎢ ⎥
⎣ ⎦ ∫ XX  
Each individual’s contribution to the likelihood function will now be:  




Xv X v v  
4.1 Identification   
In order to identify the true effect of approaching the passive benefit exhaustion, we need 
to make sure that there is some kind of random variation in the variable, pbexiτ, besides 
the direct reform variation. Since the reform rules apply differently to different 
individuals and since we observe it at the end of the previous passive UI benefit period 
we do observe large enough variation to identify the effects of a shift in pbexiτ. In Table 2 
we present the variation in time until passive benefit exhaustion pbexiτ by year. We do see 
a clear relation between calendar time and the mean value of pbexiτ., but the standard 
deviation within each year indicate that there is no significant year-to-year difference.   
 
 Table 2. Mean and std. dev. of and pbexiτ 
  pbex 
 Mean  Std. dev. 
1996 103.3  34.5 
1997 70.2  42.1 
1998 71.1  41.3 
1999 68.3  33.1 
2000 45.8  28.6 
2001 35.3  27.8 
2002   34.6  24.2 
   14
In Table 3 the rate of individuals eligible for UI benefit is presented. Two tendencies can 
be seen. First, the rate of eligible individuals clearly decreases during the period of 
interest, both among unemployed as well as employed individuals. Looking behind these 
numbers it can be seen that this decrease is driven by a decrease in the number of 
members of an UI fund. Second, the rate of eligible individuals differs considerably 
between the different groups. The highest eligibility rate is found among employed 
individuals, especially those in a non-low-wage job, and the lowest rate is found among 
individuals outside the labour force. Interestingly the eligibility rate has decreased the 
most for low-wage workers, hence with 10 percentage points compared to a decrease of 5 
percentage points for non-low-wage workers. 
  









1996  0.73  0.88 0.89 0.44 
1997 0.69  0.86 0.89 0.45 
1998  0.68  0.84 0.88 0.51 
1999 0.68  0.83 0.88 0.50 
2000  0.66  0.82 0.87 0.49 
2001 0.66  0.82 0.86 0.49 
2002  0.65  0.78 0.84 0.46 
 
5.  Low-wage spells 
We now turn to the empirical evidence for the low-wage spells. Table 4 presents the 
position on the labour market for the observed individuals, i.e. individuals who have 
previous been unemployed, one year after they entered their low-wage spell. The table is 
divided by UIB eligibility at the beginning of the low-wage spell. The risk of returning to 
unemployment is fairly high; 20% of the UIB eligible and 27% of the UIB ineligible have 
returned to unemployment one year after they entered their low-wage job. In general it 
can be seen that those individuals who were eligible for UIB at the beginning of the low-
wage spell are more likely to be in a higher-wage job one year later, whereas the 
ineligible individuals are more likely still to be in a low-wage position; hence whereas 
more than 50% of the eligible individuals are employed in a higher-wage job one year 
later, only 30% of the ineligible are. These pure descriptive figures give the clear   15
impression that those individuals eligible for UIB have an easier time overcoming a spell 
of unemployment by entering low wage, both because they are less likely to return to 
unemployment, and because they are more likely to move on to higher-wage 
employment. These figures do however not take account of any selection into either of 
the two groups, and it is hence impossible from these figures to say if the difference is 
due to a match quality effect, or merely is a selection effect. The duration analyses in the 
next section will attempt to account for this. 
 
Table 4. Distribution of labour market states one year after  
entering a low-wage spell preceded by a spell of unemployment.. 
 Eligible    Not  eligible 
 %    Obs. % Obs.
Active 2.2  278 7.1 112
Passive 17.8  2290 20.3 320
Low wage  17.3  2223 30.3 477
High wage  52.3  6719 30.5 480
Out 10.2  994 11.8 102
 
5.1  Hazard rate out of low wage 
Next, we take a look at the estimates of the duration analysis. Recall that the three 
variables of interest are: 1) pbex: time until passive benefit exhaustion (weeks) measured 
at time for exit from previous unemployment. In order to allow for different effects as the 
passive benefit exhaustion approaches I divide pbex into three variables, pbex  0-12 
months, pbex 12-24 months and pbex >24 months, each accounting for the effect within 
their interval; 2) lagdur, the duration of the past unemployment spell (months), and 3) 
eligible, a dummy for whether or not a person is eligible for UI benefit measured at each 
observed point in time. 
I start out by estimating the simple single risk hazard rate out of low wage for individuals 
who have entered low wage immediately after an unemployment spell (column 1 in Table 
5).  We can see that the coefficients to pbex differ between the size of pbex. Hence, the 
further away from passive benefit exhaustion and at least 24 months when entering low 
wage the less likely the low-wage employment is to end. On the other hand, the closer to 
benefit exhaustion and less than 12 months the less likely the low-wage employment also 
is to end. This finding covers the findings from the competing risk model, where the   16
effect of pbex differs between returning to unemployment and moving to higher wage 
employment (column 2 and 3). This result indicates that closeness to benefit exhaustion 
decreases the quality of the job taken, both as to the probability of returning to 
unemployment and to the chance of moving up the wage ladder. On the other hand, being 
eligible clearly decreases the duration of subsequent low wage, both by increased return 
to unemployment as well as increased mobility to higher wage employment; only the 
mobility out of the labour force is decreased by eligibility. That is, whereas eligibility 
might be discouraging for subsequent employment by making unemployment more 
attractive, it might also be encouraging for upward wage mobility, by allowing the 
unemployed person to wait for a job with stepping stone capability. This result is 
however likely to be affected by the adverse selection problem adherent in the UI system. 
That is, those individuals who were close to benefit exhaustion at the time of exit from 
unemployment and those individuals who were not eligible for UIB at all are likely to be 
a selected group, who per se have long unemployment durations and low probabilities of 
staying employed. By accounting for the duration of previous unemployment, this 
adverse selection can be accounted for. 
   
Table 5. Hazard out of low wage – single risk and competing risk. 
  Single risk 
Return to 
unemployment 
Mobility to higher 
wage 
Leave the labour 
force 
  Coef. 
  Std. 
Err.  Coef. 
  Std. 
Err.  Coef. 
  Std. 
Err.  Coef. 
  Std. 
Err. 
pbex 0-12 mths.  0.028 **  0.004 -0.009   0.007 0.044 ** 0.005  -0.007   0.021
pbex 12-24 mths.  -0.003   0.002 -0.008 *  0.003 0.018 ** 0.002  -0.010   0.009
pbex >24 mths.  -0.013 **  0.001 -0.008 ** 0.002 0.001   0.001  -0.004   0.004
Eligible  0.557 **  0.047 0.704 ** 0.080 0.441 ** 0.059  -0.783 ** 0.165
Lag duration  -0.004 **  0.000 -0.003 ** 0.001 -0.004 ** 0.001  0.001   0.001
Female -0.511  **  0.024 -0.381 ** 0.043 -0.597 ** 0.029  -0.048    0.119
Under30 0.043    0.028 -0.164 ** 0.054 0.147 ** 0.034  0.052    0.127
Spouse -0.024    0.025 -0.107 *  0.045 -0.015   0.031  0.091    0.118
Young child  -0.024   0.032 -0.123 *  0.059 0.009   0.040  0.164   0.147
# of children  0.000   0.015 -0.014   0.026 0.004   0.019  -0.019   0.068
Not native  -0.126 **  0.040 0.063   0.066 -0.224 ** 0.052  -0.144   0.178
Low edu  0.045   0.034 0.458 ** 0.065 -0.138 ** 0.041  0.514 ** 0.185
Medium edu  0.024   0.032 0.205 ** 0.064 -0.046   0.038  0.289   0.182
 
In the estimations of Table 5 the duration of previous unemployment is also included as 
an explanatory variable. It can be seen that the longer the previous unemployment spell,   17
the less likely the low-wage worker is to end the low-wage employment, both by moving 
to higher wage and by returning to unemployment. Only the effect of leaving the labour 
force is unaffected by the duration of previous unemployment. 
 
In Table 6 I present the result for the competing risk model where the hazard rate out of 
previous unemployment is accounted for. Column 1-3 show results of a model where vi1, 
vi2 and vi3 each are correlated with υi, but not with each other. Hence this represents a 
model with no unobserved correlation between the three destination states of the low 
wage hazard, but with correction for adverse selection. The effect of pbex is in this model 
allowed to differ between destinations of respectively 0-12 months and more than 12 
months.  
The direction of the effect of time left with passive UIB, pbex, is not changing after 
accounting for adverse selection. If anything, the size of the effect has decreased a little 
bit. Hence, the likelihood of returning to unemployment is still increasing and the 
mobility to higher wage is still decreasing the closer to benefit exhaustion the person was 
when entering the low-wage job. The effect on return to unemployment is only 
significant for residual benefit duration above 12 months, which indicate that the lower 
likelihood of returning to unemployment only takes effect for individuals who had a large 
amount of passive benefit leftover when entering low wage. The effect on mobility to 
higher wage, on the other hand, is only significant for pbex values below 12 months, 
hence only if the unemployed person takes up a low-wage job very close to the passive 
benefit exhaustion the possibility of moving on to higher wage is decreased. This fact 
indicates that the low-wage jobs taken just before the passive benefit terminates are more 
likely to be dead-end jobs. I find no significant effects of pbex on the likelihood of 
leaving the labour force. 
 If a person not is eligible at all his probability of returning to unemployment as well as 
his mobility to higher wage is significantly decreased. On the other hand, eligibility 
decreases the hazard from low wage out of the labour force, most likely because for 
individuals eligible for UIB staying in the labour force is more attractive than it is for the 
ineligible individuals.  
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Table 6. Hazard out of low wage – competing risk accounted for adverse selection. 
Low wage spell 
Return to 
unemployment 
Mobility to  
higher wage 
Leave  
the labour force 
Parameters Estimates    Std.  err. Estimates  
Std. 
Err. Estimates    Std.  err.
Pbex (years)  -0.01   0.01  0.30 ** 0.05  0.01   0.02 
  -0.01 **  0.00  0.01   0.02  0.00   0.01 
Eligible  0.73 **  0.08  0.77 ** 0.07  -0.80 **  0.18 
Unempl. dur. (months)  0.00   0.00  -1.54 ** 0.15  0.00   0.00 
Female  -0.42 **  0.05  -0.62 ** 0.03  -0.02   0.14 
Under30  -0.18 **  0.06  0.11 ** 0.04  0.00   0.15 
Spouse  -0.07   0.05  0.06   0.03  0.11   0.14 
Young child  -0.11   0.06  0.00   0.04  0.16   0.17 
# of children  -0.01   0.03  -0.02   0.02  0.01   0.08 
Not native  0.04   0.07  -0.14 ** 0.05  -0.18   0.21 
Low edu  0.40 **  0.07  -0.07   0.04  0.50 *  0.21 
Medium edu  0.17 *  0.07  -0.05   0.04  0.34   0.21 
Previous unemployment spell            
Eligible  0.67 **  0.03  0.23 ** 0.03  0.68 **  0.03 
  0.00 **  0.00  0.12 ** 0.01  0.00 **  0.00 
Female  -0.04 *  0.02  0.01   0.01  -0.04 *  0.02 
Under30  0.11 **  0.02  0.08 ** 0.02  0.10 **  0.02 
Spouse  0.11 **  0.02  0.12 ** 0.02  0.11 **  0.02 
Young child  -0.04   0.02  -0.06 ** 0.02  -0.04   0.02 
# of children  0.02 *  0.01  0.01   0.01  0.02 *  0.01 
Not native  -0.22 **  0.03  -0.14 ** 0.03  -0.21 **  0.03 
Low edu  -0.20 **  0.02  -0.09 ** 0.02  -0.21 **  0.03 
Medium edu  -0.06 **  0.02  0.04 *  0.02  -0.07 **  0.02 
v1 / v2 / v3  1.08 **  0.09  0.51   121.31 -0.55   0.46 
υ  0.56 **  0.03  0.24   34.19  0.65 **  0.04 
P(v1/v2/v3=1, υ=1)   0.79 0.33 0.96 
Log Likelihood  -74606  -98875.4  -80715.3 
 
The selection part of the model, i.e. the hazard rate out of previous unemployment, is 
informing us on another perspective of the effect of eligibility and residual passive 
benefit. Here it can be seen that eligibility increases the mobility from unemployment to 
low wage. Hence, there is no indication of UIB eligibility working as locking the 
unemployed into unemployment, at least not as opposed to low-wage employment. 
However, this effect most likely indicates that those being eligible are a selected group. 
The coefficient of pbext, which here is a time varying variable, is positive in all three 
equations. Hence the mobility from unemployment to low wage decreases as the time for 
passive benefit exhaustion approaches. This is exactly the opposite effect than predicted   19
by the matching theory, which says that as benefit termination approaches the reservation 
wage will fall and consequently the likelihood of taking up a low-wage job will increase.      
The individual specific unobserved correlation between the unemployment and the low 
wage hazards informs us on the selection process. I find that among those individuals 
who eventually return to unemployment 79% have a combination of a high mobility from 
unemployment to low wage and a high mobility returning to unemployment; the other 
21% have low mobility in both hazards. This seems to indicate that for a large amount of 
individuals there seem to be a fast low-wage – unemployment cycle. Among those 
ultimately leaving the labour force, I find that 96% have a combination of high mobility 
from unemployment to low wage and then a low mobility from low wage moving out the 
labour force. Hence low-wage employment does not seem to be a short transitory state 
between unemployment and non-participation in the labour market. Finally, I do find a 
positive correlation between those with a high hazard from unemployment to low wage 
and those with a high hazard from unemployment to higher wage, but the estimated 
coefficients are not significant. In stead, I find a negative significant effect of the duration 
of the previous unemployment spell on the subsequent low wage hazard into higher 
wage. Hence, there is clear indication that the longer the previous unemployment spell, 
the less likely it is that the low-wage employee will move on to higher wage employment.  
  
6.  Summary and Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper has been to investigate the relationship between the Danish 
unemployment insurance system and the low wage labour market. The paper explores 
several decreases in the maximum passive benefit duration which have been applied 
during the late 1990’ies to investigate the effect of being eligible for UI benefit on low-
wage durations for individuals who escape unemployment by taking up a low wage job. 
The hypothesis behind the paper is that UI benefit will have a positive effect on 
subsequent employment through decreasing searching costs and thereby enable an 
increase in the match quality. By investigating low-wage employment durations the paper 
aims to find out if the relative high mobility out of low wage previously found on Danish 
data to some extent can be attributed to the generous Danish UI system.    20
I use two different measures for UIB eligibility: a zero/one indicator for being eligible 
(eligible), and a measure for time left until exhaustion of passive UI benefit, measured at 
the time for unemployment exit (pbex).     
It is well known that long unemployment duration might be correlated with subsequent 
employment spells through unobserved heterogeneity. By including the duration of the 
previous unemployment spell the paper accounts for this adverse selection.  
The estimation results show that as the benefit exhaustion approaches, the mobility back 
to unemployment is increased, whereas the mobility into higher wage employment is 
decreased. The matching model predicts that as benefit exhaustion approaches the match 
quality of the subsequent employment spell decreases. This prediction is in accordance 
with the increased return to unemployment and the decreased mobility to higher wage 
employment. 
I find a clear correlation between being eligible for UI benefit and the duration of 
subsequent low wage; eligible individuals have a significant higher likelihood of 
returning to unemployment, but also a higher likelihood of moving to higher wage 
employment; only the mobility out of the labour force is lower for this group. This might 
be an indication of the short durations of Danish low wage jobs being attributed to the UI 
benefit system.    21
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